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norm‐referenced  form  of  feedback,  on  performance.  It  was  hypothesized  that 
the lower ranked individuals would demonstrate less performance improvement 
than  the  higher  ranked  individuals  after  receiving  feedback.  The  results  were 










which  rejects  the  mediation  hypotheses.  Nonetheless,  post  hoc  interaction 
analyses discovered a  significant  interaction effect of procedural  justice on  the 
relationship  between  forced  ranking  and  performance;  participants with  lower 
perceptions  of  procedural  justice  performed  better  than  those  with  higher 
perceptions,  and  this  effect was  the most  pronounced when  higher  ranked.  A 
possible explanation for this rather unconventional finding is discussed, together 




and the  facilitating  tendency of  intrinsic motivation on performance  is  to some 












of  the  most  frequently  used  in  organizations  today  (Blume,  Baldwin  &  Rubin 
2009).  Performance  appraisals  include,  according  to  Boswell  and  Boudreau 
(2002), tasks such as  identification of an  individual’s strengths and weaknesses, 
goal  setting,  and  recognition  of  training  needs.  Typically,  these  evaluations 
support  other  human  resource  activities  such  as  promotion  and  pay 
administration, and are characterized by comparing an individual’s performance 
to  a  standard,  other  members  of  the  organization  or  previous  performance. 
However, despite their pervasive use, research has identified many problems in 




Rubin  2009).  Given  such  inflation,  it  is  argued  that  performance  evaluations 
loose  their  credibility,  as  they  fail  to  differentiate  between  the  employees 
(Guralnik,  Rozmarin  &  So  2004).  Recently,  it  has  therefore  been  a  revival  of 
forced  ranking  systems  (Blume,  Baldwin  &  Rubin  2009),  which  is  a  type  of 
performance  appraisal  that  separate  individuals  into  preexisting  performance 
categories (Olson & Davis 2003; Hazels & Sasse 2008).  
 
Being  about  categorizing  people,  forced  ranking  has  been  and  still  is  a 
controversial issue. This has resulted in a heated debate over the pros and cons 
in both professional HR journals and the media (e.g. Meisler 2003). Jack Welch, 
the  former  superstar  CEO  of  General  Electric,  is  one  of  the  most  famous 
proponents  of  forced  ranking  (or  the  “vitality  curve”  as  referred  to  in  the 
Welchian  lingo),  arguing  that  forced  ranking  is  the  key  to  the  organization’s 
competitive advantage  (Schleicher, Bull & Green 2009). Nonetheless,  respected 
authors  have  questioned  the  validity  and  effectiveness  of  the  forced  ranking 
approach  (Pfeffer  &  Sutton  2006).  The  debate  however,  is  more  founded  on 







unanswered  questions  regarding  forced  ranking,  the  most  prominent  one  is 
perhaps whether this practice actually increases the performance of employees. 
A  key  issue  is  therefore  to  identify  how  forced  ranking  influence performance. 
This  study  examines  how  receiving  different  rank  affects  performance,  and 
therefore  contributes  to  the  human  resource  literature  in  general,  and  to  the 
performance appraisal literature in particular.   
 
Given  that  there  is  a  finding  between  forced  ranking  and  performance  it  is  of 
interest  to  include  possible  mediating  variables  in  order  to  understand  and 
better  explain  the  potential  finding.  This  as mediators  speak  to  why  and  how 
effects  between  independent  and  dependent  variables  occur  (Baron  &  Kenny 
1986).  In  this  study  three  mediating  variables  are  introduced  to  broaden  our 
understanding of the relationship between forced ranking and performance.  
 
First,  forced ranking can be regarded as a  type of  feedback as  feedback can be 
defined as  a  form of  communication  that  conveys  some degree of  information 
about  past  behavior,  performance  or  achieved  understanding  (Hattie  & 
Timperley 2007;  Ilgen, Fisher & Taylor 1979). As  feedback  is widely believed  to 
affect motivation (Bandura 1993; Deci & Ryan 2000; Locke & Latham 2002), and 
subsequent  performance  (Callahan,  Scully,  Brownlee,  Brtek  &  Tosi  2003)  it  is 
reason to believe that the relationship between forced ranking and performance 
is mediated by motivation. The link between motivation and feedback is evident 
in  many  motivational  theories  (Schunk,  Pintrich  &  Meece  2008).  In  self‐
determination theory this relation  is very much apparent. This  theory proposes 
the  concept  of  intrinsic  motivation,  which  occurs  when  a  person  performs  an 
activity  merely  for  itself  (Deci  &  Ryan  1985).  Intrinsic  motivation  is  related  to 








Second,  in  the  debate  over  forced  ranking,  justice  perceptions  have  been 
identified  as  a  potentially  important  variable  (Lawler  III  2002;  Meisler  2003; 
Olson & Davis  2003;  Sears & McDermott 2003).  This  is  because  forced  ranking 
makes  the  ranking  of  an  individual’s  performance  dependent  on  others’ 
performance.  Roch,  Sternburgh  and  Caputo  (2007)  suggest  that  such  relative 
performance  appraisal  formats  are  perceived  to  be  less  fair  than  absolute 
formats. As such, it is reason to believe that justice perceptions, more specifically 
distributive  and  procedural  justice,  mediate  the  relationship  between  forced 
ranking  and  performance.  On  this  basis  we  propose  the  following  research 
question:  
 





research  question.  A  conceptual  model  is  introduced  to  illustrate  the 
hypothesized  relationships.  The method  section  outlines  the  procedure  of  the 
study, operalizations and measurement of variables and method of analysis. The 
results  of  the  hypotheses  testing  is  then  presented  and  then  subsequently 
discussed  in  relation  to  the  theoretical  background. We also performed a  post 
hoc  interaction  analysis,  which  is  presented  in  the  same  section.  Then  we 











In  this  section  we  review  research  and  theories  on  forced  ranking,  feedback, 




Forced  ranking  is  a  type  of  performance  appraisal  where  evaluations  are 
required  to  fit  along  the  lines  of  a  particular  distribution  (Schleicher,  Bull  and 
Green  2009).  This  performance  evaluation  approach  is  based  on  the  repeated 
finding  in  social  sciences  that  when measured  in  large  enough  samples,  most 
human  phenomena  tend  to  follow  a  normally  distributed  curve  (Guralnik, 
Rozmarin & So 2004).  The “archetype” of forced ranking is thus the procedure of 
categorizing  individuals  into  preexisting  performance  categories,  against  other 
employees in the department or peer group (e.g. a 20‐70‐10 distribution) (Olson 
& Davis 2003). These performance rankings are then applied to a bell curve, with 
those  ranking  at  the  bottom  (usually  10%)  being  put  on  probation,  given 
improvement  possibilities  or  terminated.  By  contrast,  those  ranking  on  top 
(usually  20%)  are  generously  rewarded  for  their  performance  (Hazels  &  Sasse 
2008). Obviously,  forced  ranking  systems  contrasts with  an  absolute  system of 





of  feedback  to  individuals  in  organizations  (Bartol,  Durham  &  Poon  2001). 
Despite  impassioned  anecdotal  accounts  (e.g.  Lawler  III  2002;  Grote  2005)  on 
both  side  of  the  debate,  very  little  empirical  research  has  emerged  on  forced 
ranking  (Blume, Baldwin & Rubin 2009). Therefore,  it  is of  interest  to  look  into 
what the feedback literature could contribute with to this debate. On a general 





Fisher  &  Taylor  1979;  Hattie  &  Timperley  2007).  Yet  having  this  stated  it  is 
important  to note  that  feedback  is  far  from a  simple  stimulus  as  feedback has 
several  dimensions.  One  of  the  most  important  distinctions  is  feedback  sign‐ 
whether  the  feedback  is  positive  or  negative  (Ilgen,  Fisher  &  Taylor  1979; 
Podsakoff  &  Farh  1989).  Furthermore,  feedback  can  be  conceptualized  as 
formative  or  summative  and  norm‐referenced  or  self‐referenced  (Chan &  Lam 
2010).  Summative  feedback  focuses  on  the  outcome,  whereas  formative 
feedback  provides  the  individual  with  learning  cues  in  how  to  progress  (Taras 
2005;  Covic &  Jones  2008).  Self‐referenced  feedback  involves  self‐comparative 
appraisal,  whereas  norm‐referenced  concerns  social‐comparative  appraisal 
(Chan & Lam 2010). Applied to the case of forced ranking it is seems reasonable 
to argue that forced ranking is a summative, norm‐referenced form of feedback 




The  little  attention  that  has  been  devoted  to  the  field  of  forced  ranking  also 
transmits  to  our  knowledge  about  the  relation  between  forced  ranking  and 
performance.  Nonetheless,  there  are  some  studies  that  have  approached  the 
issue  of  forced  ranking  and  performance.  A  simulation  study  conducted  by 
Scullen,  Bergey  and  Aiman‐Smith  (2005)  investigated  if  implementation  of  a 
forced distribution rating system (FDRS) could improve the average quality of an 
organization’s workforce. Their findings revealed that FDRS could in fact improve 
the  workforce  potential,  however,  potential  side  effects  such  as  decline  in 




and  findings  from  Festinger,  Garcia  and  Tor  (2007)  claim  that  this  comparison 
process  often  results  in  competitive  behavior.  Their  findings  indicate  that  it  is 





forced  ranking  can  lead  to  greater  competition  among  the employees. Greater 
competition may  sound positive;  however  this  can  actually  have  a  detrimental 
effect. As stated by Garcia and Tor (2007, 106):  
while highly ranked employees may be more competitive and productive through simple 
self  selection,  the  championing  of  forced  rankings  fails  to  anticipate  how  competitive 
forces may ultimately  inhibit  the profit‐maximizing exchange or pooling of  information 
and resources among those ‘star’ employees.  
On  the  basis  of  the  study  by  Scullen,  Bergey  and  Aiman‐Smith    (2005)  it  is 
possible to argue that there is a positive relationship between forced ranking and 
organizational performance. However, we are  interested  in how forced ranking 
relates  to  individual  performance,  which makes  the  findings  of  this  study  less 
relevant. As forced ranking is conceptualized as a type of feedback, we turn back 




It  is  a well‐established  finding  that  feedback  is  related  to  performance  (Kim & 
Hamner 1976; Illgen, Fisher & Taylor 1979; Larson Jr. 1989; Early, Northcraft, Lee 
& Lituchy 1990; Kluger & DeNisi 1998; Goodman, Wood & Hendrickx 2004; Hattie 
&  Timperley  2007;  Anseel,  Lievens  &  Schollaert  2009).  As  pointed  to  above, 
forced  ranking  is  a  form  of  performance  feedback,  hence  forced  ranking  are 
expected to relate to performance in some way or another. The initial theoretical 
arguments for the effectiveness of feedback were provided by Thorndike and his 
law  of  effect  (Kluger  &  DeNisi  1998).  Positive  feedback  was  equated  with 
reinforcement, and negative feedback with punishment. Both types of feedback 
should improve performance because positive feedback reinforces performance, 
whereas  negative  feedback  punishes  the  erroneous  behavior  (Kluger  &  DeNisi 
1998).  An  influential  and  much  cited  review  by  Ammons  (1956)  gave  further 
support  for  the  beneficial  effect  of  feedback  on  performance.  Given  this 





high  should  be  even  more  motivated  to  perform,  whereas  those  ranked  as 
average‐  or  low  performers  would  get  a  kick  in  the  pants  to  enhance  their 
performance.  
 
Nevertheless, more  recent  research  on  feedback  (e.g.  Kluger  and DeNisi  1996) 
suggests  that  not  all  feedback  necessarily  lead  to  better  performance.  Indeed, 
the  presence  of  negative  effects  of  feedback  is  robust;  about  34‐38  %  of  the 
effect sizes investigated in a meta‐analysis by Kluger and DeNisi (1996) showed a 
negative  effect  on  subsequent  performance.  The  theoretical  explanation 
provided  (Feedback  Intervention  Theory)  suggests  that  feedback  that  directs 
attention  to  the  self  (for  example  “You  are  a  great  student”)  is more  likely  to 
attenuate the effect of feedback on performance. By contrast,  feedback effects 
on  performance  are  augmented  by  feedback  that  is  related  to  the  task  (for 
example  “This  essay  can  be  improved  if  elaborating  more  on  the  theoretical 
concepts”). The explaining mechanism is that cues that shifts attention to the self 
reallocates  cognitive  resources  from  the  task  to  the  self,  and  in  such  a  way 




found  that  rank‐order  grading  could  generate  improved  student  performance 
relative  to  criterion‐  referenced  grading,  Butler  and  Nisan  (1986)  found  that 
grades might encourage an emphasis on quantitative aspects of learning, reduce 
creativity,  promote  fear  of  failure,  and  weaken  interest.  As  we  observe,  the 




relation  to  forced  ranking.  Given  that  feedback  derived  from  forced  ranking  is 
norm‐referenced,  that  is,  feedback  that  conveys  comparative  information,  it 
could be argued that this type of feedback diverts attention from the task to the 




shown  to  be  largely  ineffective  (Kluger  and  DeNisi  1998).  Similarly,  a  study  by 
Butler  (1987)  found  that  grades  increased  ego  involvement,  but  did  not  affect 
performance  relative  to  the  no‐feedback  control  group.  This  contradicts  the 
earlier understanding of  feedback,  in  that  feedback  is not universally positively 




consequently  performance  (Butler  1987).  In  particular,  feedback  that  provides 
corrective  information  (e.g.  formative  feedback)  has  shown  to  be  effective  in 
relation  to  performance  (Hattie  &  Timperley  2007).  Thus,  we  run  into  muddy 
waters,  as  the  forced  ranking  feedback does not neatly  fall  into  the distinction 
between feedback directed to task or self. Consequently, it is somewhat difficult 
to  predict  the  effects  of  forced  ranking  on  performance.  However,  given  that 
forced  ranking  conveys  comparative  information,  it would  be hard  to  overlook 
the  social  comparison  aspect  of  forced  ranking,  which  is  argued  to  be  largely 










Owning  to  the  limited  research  on  forced  ranking,  we  know  little  about  what 
factors that might intervene between forced ranking and performance. However, 
as  forced  ranking  represents  a  type  of  feedback,  we  expect  that  the  effect  of 
forced  ranking  on  performance  could  be  mediated  by  motivation.  This  as 
feedback  is  widely  believed  to  affect  motivation  (Bandura  1993;  Deci  &  Ryan 









as  a  sub‐theory  within  SDT  with  the  aim  of  specifying  factors  that  explain 
variability in intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan 2000). Intrinsic motivation can be 
defined as the motivation to perform an activity for itself, in order to experience 
the  pleasure  and  satisfaction  inherent  in  the  activity  (Deci  &  Ryan  1985). 





intrinsic  motivation,  and  that  negative  performance  feedback  can  diminish  it 
(Deci,  Ryan  &  Koestner  1999;  Deci  &  Ryan  2000).  However,  positive  feedback 
that  is  perceived  as  controlling,  that  is,  positive  feedback  having  an  evaluative 
character,  or  emphasizing  how  one  should  perform  –  has  clearly  shown  to 
decrease  intrinsic  motivation  (Ryan  1982;  Deci,  Connell  &  Ryan  1989).  Ryan 
(1982) suggests that positive feedback can be perceived either as  informational 
or  controlling  depending  on  various  factors,  and  that  these  will  determine 
whether  the  positive  feedback  increases  or  decreases  intrinsic  motivation. 
Drawing this link to forced ranking it is reasonable to argue that positive ranking 
could  be  interpreted  as  controlling.  This  as  forced  ranking  has  a  normative 
character  and  as  such  state  something  about  how  a  person  should  perform, 
which may  lead  to a decrease  in  intrinsic motivation. However,  a positive  rank 
could also be interpreted as information about one’s competence and therefore 
increase  intrinsic  motivation.  For  participants’  receiving  a  negative  rating  it  is 
possible to infer that they will experience a decline in intrinsic motivation in both 
of  the  conditions  –  either  they  perceive  the  ranking  as  controlling  or  as 
decreasing  perceptions  of  competence:  both  of  which  decrease  intrinsic 




(middle)  ranked  individuals  will  experience  lower  levels  of  intrinsic motivation 
than the higher ranked. 
 
Before  the  millennium  few  studies  had  examined  the  performance  effects 
associated  with  intrinsic  motivation.  Rather,  much  of  the  intrinsic  motivation 
literature  had  focused  on  how  extrinsic  motivational  sources  affect  intrinsic 
motivation  (Callahan,  Scully,  Brownlee,  Brtek &  Tosi  2003).  Today  however we 
have  achieved  a  great  deal  more  knowledge  on  this  relation.  For  example, 
Callahan, Scully, Brownlee, Brtek and Tosi (2003) examined the unique effects of 
multiple  sources  on  task  performance,  and  found  that  intrinsic motivation had 
the  greatest  effect  on  performance.  Moreover,  two  studies  by  Kuvaas  (2006; 
2007)  reported  a  positive  relation  between  intrinsic  motivation  and 
performance.  In  a  study  on  transformational  leadership  and  job  behaviors 
Piccolo  and  Colquitt  (2006)  also  found  that  the  indirect  effect  of  intrinsic 
motivation  supported  the  direct  effect  of  transformational  leadership  on  task 
performance.  Finally,  a  study  by  Dysvik  and  Kuvaas  (2008)  observed  that  the 
relationship  between  perceived  training  opportunities  and  work  performance 
was  fully mediated  by  intrinsic motivation.  All  these  studies  thus  suggest  that 








forced  ranking  (Lawler  III  2002;  Meisler  2003;  Olson  &  Davis  2003;  Sears  & 
McDermott 2003), and a peak into the organizational justice research therefore 
seems  appropriate.  Research  on  organizational  justice  has  identified  different 
forms of justice, most notably distributive justice and procedural justice (Colquitt 
2001). Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of outcomes, whereas 




outcomes where  arrived  at  (Cohen‐Charash  &  Spector  2001).  A  vast  literature 
provides evidence for people making distinctive judgments about procedural and 




little  empirical  research.  Although  considerable  research  has  documented  the 
importance  of  justice  perceptions  in  connection  to  performance  evaluation 
processes  in organizations  (Bartol, Durham & Poon 2001),  there  is however no 
studies  to  our  knowledge  that  investigates  justice  perceptions  and  subsequent 
performance after  receiving  forced  ranking  feedback. Nonetheless,  research on 
performance  evaluations  has  identified  the  format  of  performance  appraisal 




of  performance  appraisal  systems.  They  point  to  that  a  typical  three‐category 
system is designed to capture 70‐80 % of employees in the middle category. For 
example,  if  performance  were  normally  distributed,  an  employee  receiving 
performance  feedback  one  standard  deviation  below  average  would  typically 
receive  the  same  performance  rating  as  a  colleague  performing  one  standard 
deviation above average, which could influence justice perceptions. Thus, it does 
not  seem  unreasonable  to  argue  that  forced  ranking  could  influence  justice 
perceptions. 
 












the  highly  ranked.  Second,  research  has  shown  that  when  outcomes  are  low, 
perceptions of procedural justice becomes more important (Roch, Sternburgh & 
Caputo 2007). It is proposed that individuals who receive high ratings may not be 
particularly  concerned  about  procedural  justice,  and  therefore would  be more 
likely to perceive the ranking procedure as fair. The low and middle ranked will 





such  as  affective  commitment  (Kuvaas  2003),  organizational  commitment 
(Farndale,  Hope‐Hailey  &  Kelliher  2011),  performance  (Lind,  Kanfer  &  Earley 
1990) and turnover (Simons & Roberson 2003). Furthermore, equity theory holds 
that  when  an  individual  perceives  distributive  injustice  at  work,  the  employee 












The  conceptual  model  (Figure  1)  is  based  on  the  preceding  presentation  and 
discussion of the hypotheses. H1 is based on the general feedback literature and 





intrinsic  motivation  as  a  mediating  variable  between  forced  ranking  and 































to  become  ranked  in  correspondence  to  their  performance  relative  to  others. 
Computer  simulations moreover  provide  participants with  a  complex model  of 
reality (Salas, Wildman, and Piccolo 2009), and are therefore considered suitable 
for the purpose of this study as this complexity might trigger intrinsic motivation, 




where  they  had  to  handle  incidents  that  ‘popped  up’  as  blinking  signs  on  the 
map.  By  clicking  on  these  signs  the  participants  received  text  messages 
describing  each  incident  and  cues  on  how  to  proceed.  In  order  for  the 
participants to handle the incidents the participants were instructed to make use 
of  several  resources  that  they  could  engage  by  ‘dragging’  them  from  their 
current  locations  on  the  map,  and  ‘drop’  the  resources  on  the  blinking  sign 
(incident symbol).  
 
There  were  four  types  of  resources  available  in  the  computer  simulation: 
transportation  helicopters,  rescue  helicopters,  surveillance  aircraft  and  fighter 
aircraft.  For  each  resource  it  was  possible  to  select  a  particular  capacity  that 
could  be  more  suitable  for  each  of  the  incidents.  A  default  capacity  for  each 

















Participants  in  this  study were mainly  from  BI  Norwegian  Business  School  and 
consisted  of  80  participants.  In  total,  six  sessions  were  run  with  7  to  18 
individuals  participating  each  time.  Participants  in  this  study were  between  21 
and  41  years  of  age,  and  76.3%  of  the  participants were  female.  77.5%  had  a 






After  completing  scenario  1  all  participants  were  given  feedback  on  their 
performance  relative  to  the  other  participants  by  receiving  information  on 







The  performance  scores  in  each  scenario  were  determined  by  whether  the 
participant  managed  to  react  quickly  (decision  speed),  and  with  accuracy 
(selecting  the  right  resources  and  capacities).  At  the  end  of  each  task  in  the 
scenario,  the  participant’s  degree  of  success  at  handling  the  situation  was 
displayed as a numeric “effect” variable ranging from 0 to 100%. If the task were 




effect  was  lower  than  75  %.  In  total,  we  have  twenty‐four  observations  of 
performance  per  participant,  as  each  completed  twelve  tasks  both  in  scenario 
one and in scenario two.    
 
Unfortunately,  there  are  missing  values  on  our  performance  variables.  When 
presence of missing  values,  the  issue  is  to  identify  the patterns underlying  the 
missing data in order to maintain as close as possible the original distribution of 
values when any sort of remedy is applied (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson 2010). 




the  dependent  variable.  Therefore,  the  distribution  of  missing  data  has  to  be 
characterized  as  MCAR  (missing  completely  at  random)  (Tabachnick  &  Fidell 
2007). This  is supported by a non‐significant Little’s MCAR test (χ² = 57.55, df = 
57,  Sig.  =  0.455).    The null  hypothesis  for  this  test  is  that  the data  are missing 
completely at random, and a statistical non‐significant result is therefore desired.  
 
Turning  to  the prevalence of  the missing data, our missing data analysis  (MVA) 
reveals that we have a total of 145 missing cases out of 1920 observations (24 x 
80  =1920).  The missing  data make  up  7,55  %  of  the  total  data.  However,  the 



















missing  values  when  the  missing  values  are  concentrated  in  few  variables, 
contingent  that  these  are  not  critical  to  the  analysis.  PERF2S11  and  PERF2S12 
have such a high number of missing values that we find it reasonable to exclude 
them from further analysis. Excluding these two implies deletion of PERFIS11 and 
PERF1S12  as  well,  because  we  need  comparable  observations.  This  leaves  us 
with only three variables with missing values: PERF2S8 (1 missing), PERF2S9 (18 
missing)  and  PERF2S10  (18  missing).  Given  that  we  think  it  would  be 
unreasonable to delete these variables because of the resulting data loss, we are 
left with either deleting the missing cases or impute the missing data (Hair, Black, 
Babin & Anderson 2010). As our missing  values  are  characterized as MCAR we 
have many options.  
 
The  listwise method  uses  only  cases with  complete  data  (Hair,  Black,  Babin  & 
Anderson 2010). This approach is however limited in use for our data, because it 
would reduce the sample size by nearly one quarter, which  is a massive  loss of 




because  it  is  a  more  sophisticated  method  for  estimating  missing  values 
(Tabachnick  &  Fidell  2007).  Other  variables  are  here  used  as  independent 
variables to estimate a regression equation for the variables with missing values 
serving  as  the  dependent  variables.  It  is  not  without  its  disadvantages;  this 
method understates variance unless an error term is added to the replacement 
values  (Tabachnick  &  Fidell  2007).  Fortunately,  SPSS  (the  statistical  software 
used)  allows  adding  a  random  component  to  the  regression  estimates.  The 
regression imputation was therefore run with adding residuals to the regression 







With  the  imputation  procedure  successfully  performed,  the  most  appropriate 
way to calculate the performance variable had to be decided on. Given that we 
are not  interested  in  the absolute performance  level of participants but  rather 
the  change  in  performance  from  time  one  to  time  two,  some  sort  of  change 
variable had  to be created. We chose not put performance at  time  two as  the 
dependent variable, and performance at  time one as a covariate  in addition  to 
the other  independent variables. The reason why is that performance time one 
and  one  of  the  independent  variables,  forced  ranking,  contain  to  a  very  large 
degree  the same  information, and  therefore could potentially  inflate  the effect 
of forced ranking.  
 
A  second  concern was  adjusting  for  regression  to  the mean. Regression  to  the 
mean (RTM) refers to “…the tendency for extreme observations in a distribution 
at  baseline  to move  closer  to  the mean  at  follow‐up.”  (Smith &  Beaton  2008, 
290). Applied to our case, it  is not unlikely that individuals performing excellent 
at time one could perform less well in the second scenario, and vice versa for the 
individuals  performing  very  bad,  regardless  of  the  performance  feedback 
(ranking) actually  received. Thus,  if RTM  is not adjusted  for, we  run  the  risk of 







recommendations  by  Smith  and  Beaton  (2008)  the  residuals  scores  were 
calculated by  regressing  time  two scores of performance on  the corresponding 
time  one  scores,  after  centering  the  performance  at  time  one  variable.  In 
addition,  a  squared  term  of  performance  at  time  one  was  added  to  the 
regression  equation  to  better  adjust  the  residuals  relative  to  each  participant. 








Intrinsic  motivation,  distributive  and  procedural  justice  were  measured  by  a 
questionnaire  before  scenario  2,  right  after  the  participants  had  received 
feedback. The intrinsic motivation scale used in the present study was based on a 
scale developed by Kuvaas and Dysvik (2009) and was adapted to fit the context 
of  the  simulation. Participants were asked  to  indicate  their  agreement with  six 
items concerning their inner drive to accomplish their tasks on a five point Likert 
scale.    The distributive  and procedural  justice  scales  used  in  the present  study 
were based on two scales developed by Colquitt (2001) and were adapted to fit 
the  context  of  the  simulation.  Participants  were  asked  to  indicate  their 
agreement with a total of eleven items concerning their feedback score and the 
procedures  to  arrive  at  that  feedback  score  on  a  five  point  Likert  scale.  The 




The  items of  the  intrinsic motivation, distributive  justice and procedural  justice 
scales (17 in total) were subjected to principal components analysis with oblique 
rotation  (Direct  Oblimin).  The  sample  size  of  80  was  just  below  the 
recommendations  of  at  least  five  participants  per  variable  (5  x  17  =  85)  (Field 




statistical  significance  (p  =  .000).  These measures  suggest  that  our  data  set  is 
appropriate  for  factor  analysis  (Pallant  2010).    An  initial  analysis  was  run  to 
obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data. Four factors had eigenvalues 




variance.  The  scree  plot  was  slightly  ambiguous,  and  showed  inflexions  that 
would  justify  retaining  both  three  and  four  components.  Given  that  we  on 







Item  1  2  3    
The tasks that I did in the simulation were 
themselves representing a driving power  .756      .590 
The tasks that I did in the simulation was 
enjoyable  .855      .773 
I felt that the simulation was meaningful  .857      .739 
The simulation was very exciting  .851      .828 
The simulation was so interesting that it was 
a motivation in itself  .849      .771 
I was so inspired by the simulation that I 
almost forgot everything around me  .823      .638 
Does your feedback score reflect the effort 
you have put into the simulation activity?    .862    .708 
Is your feedback score appropriate for the 
activity you have completed?    .790    .648 
Does your feedback score reflect what you 
have contributed with in the simulation 
activity?    .867    .771 
Is your feedback score justified, given your 
performance?    .695    .641 
Do you think that those procedures have 
been applied consistently?      ‐.692  .551 
Do you think those procedures has been free 
of bias?      ‐.889  .726 
Do you think those procedures have been 
based on accurate information?      ‐.770  .653 
Do you think that those procedures have 





We  rerun  the  analysis  with  specifying  three  as  the  number  of  components  to 
extract.  The  three  items  (Procedural  justice  items  1,  2  and  6)  that  previously 




subsequently  dropped  because  they  failed  to  reach  the  level  of  statistical 
significance  recommended  for  our  sample  size:  0.6  (Hair,  Black,  Babin  & 
Anderson  2010).  These  items  were  not  critical  to  our  analysis.  Finally,  the 




2010),  with  all  components  showing  a  number  of  strong  loadings  and  all 
variables loading considerably on only one component. The interpretation of the 
three components  is straightforward;  intrinsic motivation  items  loaded strongly 
on  Component  1,  distributive  justice  items  on  Component  2,  and  procedural 
justice  items  on  Component  3.    The  pattern matrix  and  communalities  of  the 
final solution is presented in Table 2. There were weak correlations between the 
factors  (see  Table  3).    Note  that  these  correlations  are  based  on  an  Oblimin 
rotation,  and  that  the  interpretation of  the  relation between  these variables  is 
only appropriate within the factor analysis. The variables to be used in the later 
analyses  are  generated on  equally weighted  items  from  the  raw data,  and  the 
correlations will  therefore be different (see table 4). The results of this analysis 
support  the  use  of  the  items  as  separate  scales.  For  the  factor  intrinsic 
motivation,  a  Cronbach’s  alpha  value  of  .919  is  well  above  the  recommended 





  Intrinsic motivation  Distributive justice  Procedural justice 
Intrinsic motivation  1  ‐  ‐ 
Distributive justice  .043  1  ‐ 









dependent  variable  (Pedhazur  &  Schmelkin  1991).  Control  variables  were 
measured by a questionnaire sent out via email to participants beforehand (see 
Appendix  C).  The  control  variables  that were measured  by  several  items were 
subjected  to  factor  analysis,  and  internal  consistency  of  the  items  were 








computer  simulation  may  benefit  those  with  military  experience.  Military 
experience  was  measured  with  four  items.  These  were  subjected  to  factor 
analysis, and the results revealed the presence of two factors: the first reflecting 
crisis experience and the other military education. The Cronbach’s alpha of  the 
first  factor was  .667. The other  factor consisted of only one  item,  thus  internal 
consistency reliability cannot be estimated.  
 






As we decided  to delete  task 11 and 12 because of  their high  levels of missing 










Hierarchical  linear modeling  (HLM) was  used  for  analysis  in  the  present  study. 
HLM was chosen for  two reasons. First, because we have a repeated measures 
data  set,  and  secondly  because  the  data  is  organized  on more  than  one  level. 
When data  for participants  is organized on more  than one  level,  the  individual 
observations are generally not  independent as  the observations  from the same 
individual are commonly more similar than observations from another individual 
(Hox  2010).  Figure  2  illustrates  the  levels  of  measurement  and  the 
measurements performed at each level. The first level is the repeated measures 
level, with measurements of the ten tasks in each scenario (N=800). The second 












           
In repeated measures data the dependent variable is measured more than once 
for each participant, and HLM is often used for repeated measurements with the 
repeated measurement at  the  first  level of analysis  (Hox 2010). This  is because 
multiple observations are available for each participant, and these observations 
tend  to  be  correlated with  each  other  (West  2009).  By  organizing  the  data  on 
different  levels we  thus  avoid  violating  the  assumption  of  independence  of  all 
observations  and  interpretational  errors  as  well.  For  example,  organizing  the 









fixed  effects  the  value  of  a  parameter  is  ‘fixed’  to  a  constant  over  all  subjects 
(Tabachnick  &  Fidell  2007).  Random  effects  are  therefore  specific  to  subjects 
within the population, whilst fixed effects describe the relationships between the 
dependent  variable  and  predictor  variables  for  an  entire  population  (West, 
Welch & Galecki 2007). In the present study random effects were estimated for 








to  estimate  in  each  model,  our  sample  size  of  80  with  ten  observations  on 
performance per person,  giving a  total  of  800 observations on performance,  is 
deemed sufficient. As described in section 3.4 the missing values were replaced 
with  imputation.  Performing  the  analysis  without  the  imputed  data  did  not 
produce  noticeable  differences,  which  indicates  that  the  imputation  was 
appropriate. Furthermore, as HLM is an extension of multiple  linear regression, 
the  assumptions  of  this  technique  also  pertains  to  HLM  (Tabachnick  &  Fidell 
2007).  In  order  to  assess  normality,  a  descriptive  statistic  was  run  on  all  the 
predictors  and  the  dependent  variable.  All  variables  met  the  assumptions  of 
normality,  linearity  and  homoscedasticity,  except  for  intrinsic  motivation  that 
displayed  signs  of  kurtosis.  Nonetheless,  an  inspection  of  the  histogram  and 
normal probability plot showed that this variable was reasonably normal (Pallant 









predictors  are  adjusted  for,  which  makes  it  more  likely  that  none  of  their 
regression coefficients will be statistically significant (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).  
A multicollinarity statistic was therefore run on the variables. Of the predictors, 
the  lowest  tolerance  value  was  .74,  which  is  far  above  the  recommended 
threshold  value  of  .10  (Hair,  Black,  Babin  &  Anderson  2010).    Of  the  control 
variables,  the  lowest  tolerance  value  was  .248,  which  also  is  above  the 
recommended  threshold  value  of  .10.  Finally,  all  predictors  except  rank  (only 






for  the  dependent  variable  was  estimated.  Second,  the  full  model  with  all 
predictors and the significant control variables was estimated. Each hypothesis is 
then  examined  through  evaluating  the  sign,  size  and  significance  level  of  each 
regression parameter. Overall model fit is evaluated by comparing the values of 















method  of  estimation  was  maximum  likelihood  (ML)  for  both  models,  as  the 






































This makes  these  variables more  likely  to  become  significant  as  they  have  ten 
times higher sample size than they really have. This is because large samples are 




Means,  Standard  Deviations,  and  Intercorrelations  of  the  Independent  and 
Dependent Variables 
Variable  M  SD  1  2  3  4  5 
1. Forced ranking  1.02  .725  —         
2. Performance   .000  .291  ‐.098**  —       
3. Intrinsic Motivation  .000  5.562  .140**  .041  —     
4. Procedural Justice  .000  3.144  .011  ‐.032  .348**  —   
5. Distributive Justice  .000  3.730  ‐.131**  ‐.015  .053  .262**  — 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.  
 
Table  4  indicates  no  support  for  H1,  as  forced  ranking  is  negatively  correlated 
with  performance  (r  =  ‐.098,  p  <  .01),  which  is  opposite  of  the  hypothesized 
direction.  There  is  some  preliminary  support  for  hypothesis  H2,  as  there  is  a 
significant positive correlation between forced ranking and intrinsic motivation (r 
=  .140, p  <  .01),  however,  there  is  no  significant  relationship between  intrinsic 
motivation and performance. Hypothesis H3 receives no support, given the non‐
significant  correlation  between  forced  ranking  and  procedural  justice,  and 

















Variable  Performance   Intrinsic mot.  Procedural jus.  Distributive jus. 
Forced ranking  ‐.037**  n/aa  n/aa  n/aa 
  (.011)       
Intrinsic mot.   .0031       
  (.001)       
Procedural jus.  ‐.004       
  (.003)       
Distributive jus.  .001       
  (.002)       
Task difficulty  .344**          












Variables  Intrinsic mot.  Procedural jus.  Distributive jus. 























This  implies  that  those  ranked  high  performed  worse  after  receiving  forced 
ranking  feedback,  and  that  those  ranking  low performed better  after  receiving 
forced  ranking  feedback.  It  was  hypothesized  that  lower  ranked  participants 
would  demonstrate  less  improvement  than  higher  ranked  participants, 
Hypothesis 1 therefore receives no support.  
 
The multilevel  model  failed  to  converge  when  estimating  the  effect  of  forced 
ranking  on  intrinsic motivation.  However,  as  can  be  seen  in  Table  6,  a  simple 
regression was  run  to  estimate  this  relationship.  Although  the  sign  and  size  of 
the  regression  coefficient  indicates  a  positive  relationship  between  forced 
ranking  and  intrinsic  motivation,  the  regression  coefficient  is  not  significant, 
indicating no statistical evidence for the theoretical assertion that forced ranking 
affects  intrinsic  motivation.  Furthermore,  it  was  hypothesized  that  individuals 
with  high  levels  of  intrinsic  motivation  would  perform  better  than  individuals 
with  low  levels. The effect of  intrinsic motivation on performance  is marginally 




Turning  to  the  justice  variables,  the  multilevel  model  also  failed  to  converge 
when  estimating  the  effects  of  forced  ranking  on  procedural  and  distributive 
justice.  Simple  regressions were  therefore  run  (see Table 6), with  the  result  of 
non‐significant  regression  coefficients  for  both  procedural  and  distributive 





the  hypothesized  direction.  Nonetheless,  the  regression  coefficient  is  non‐
significant, providing no statistical evidence for the relationship between forced 
ranking and procedural  justice. The regression coefficient  for  forced ranking on 
distributive  justice  is  larger  than  that  for  procedural  justice,  and unexpectedly, 
negative  in  sign.  This  is  an  unexpected  finding,  and  clearly  not  in  the 
hypothesized  direction.  Regarding  the  justice  variables  on  performance, 
procedural  and distributive  justice did not  significantly affect performance  (p = 
.187, p = .627, respectively). In addition, the regression coefficient for procedural 
justice was in the opposite direction, indicating a negative relationship between 




Table  5  also  points  to  significant  effects  of  control  variables.  Of  all  control 
variables,  task difficulty was  the only one with  statistical  significance  (p <  .01). 





Based  on  the  framework  of  Baron  and  Kenny  (1986),  a  variable  functions  as  a 
mediator when  1)  variations  in  levels  of  the  independent  variable  significantly 
account  for  variations  on  the  hypothesized  mediator,  2)  variations  in  the 
mediator  significantly  explain  variations  in  the  dependent  variable,  3)  a 
previously  significant  relationship  between  the  independent  and  dependent 
variable becomes insignificant when the mediator is controlled for. First, forced 
ranking  must  affect  the  mediators  (intrinsic  motivation,  procedural‐  and 
distributive justice). When we tried to model these relationships the model failed 
to  converge,  leaving  us  with  no  reliable  estimate  of  these  relationships.  The 





distributive  justice.  Second,  the  mediators  must  also  affect  the  dependent 
variable  in  order  to  establish  mediation.  Here  there  is  only  a  marginally 
significant  relationship  between  intrinsic motivation  and performance,  and not 
significant relationships between the justice variables and performance. Third, it 
is  vital  that  there  is  a  relationship  between  the  independent  variable  forced 
ranking  and  the  dependent  variable  performance.  There  is  a  significant 
relationship here, although not in the hypothesized direction. Given that the only 
significant  relationship  on  a  .05  level  is  between  forced  ranking  and 
performance, the conditions are not present to establish mediation. Thus, none 
of  the mediation  hypotheses  (2,  3  and  4)  are  supported.  Due  to  this  state  of 
affairs of non‐significance we will  conduct post hoc  tests  to  investigate  if  there 
are any  interaction effects. Given  that  such moderating effects are  found,  they 






the  direction  and/or  strength  of  the  relationship  between  a  predictor  and  a 






In  relation  to  intrinsic  motivation,  it  is  reasonable  to  argue  that  it  could  be 
conceptualized as a moderator of  the  relationship between  forced  ranking and 
performance.  Although  intrinsic  motivation  is  influenced  by  situational  factors 
such as task characteristics, it could be argued that it has a global component as 










performance. With  basis  in  the  Just World  Theory,  it  is  suggested  that  beliefs 
about  procedural  and  distributive  justice  not  only  encompass  situational 
assessments of justice, but also more stable dispositional tendencies to perceive 
outcomes and/or  rules and processes as uniquely deserved  (Lucas 2009). More 
specifically,  individuals  with  high  distributive  justice  beliefs  are  more  likely  to 
believe that people generally get what they deserve in life. Similarly, individuals 
with  high  procedural  justice  beliefs  are more  likely  to  perceive  that  people  in 
general  are  treated  fairly  (Lucas  2009).  Given  that  participants’  answering  on 
procedural and distributive  justice  items  in our experiment  reflect  such deeper 
attitudes, it could be argued that participants with high distributive justice beliefs 








Variable  Intrinsic mot.  Procedural jus.  Distributive jus.  Full model 
Forced ranking  ‐.004  ‐.007*  ‐.004   
  (.002)  (.003)  (.002)   
AIC  ‐ 86.733  ‐ 87.454  ‐ 85.933  ‐86.082 




In order  to evaluate how  the added  interactions affected model  fit,  the model 







For  graphical  illustration  of  the  interaction  see  Figure  3.  Given  the  non‐






Note.  Performance  is  conceptualized  as  the  expected  change  in  performance  from  time  one  to 
time two and not in absolute terms (see discussion page 15‐19).  
 
As  can be  seen  from Figure 3,  two  rather puzzling  findings  are observed.  First, 
confirming the negative sign of  the regression coefficient  for procedural  justice 
on  performance  (see  Table  5),  those  with  higher  perceptions  of  procedural 
justice perform worse in the second scenario than those with lower perceptions 
of  procedural  justice.  Given  our  theoretical  expectations  that  perceiving  high 
procedural  justice  would  be  beneficial  for  performance,  this  finding  clearly 
speaks  in  the  opposite  direction.  Second,  this  tendency  is  increasing with  rank 
level, suggesting that this effect is most pronounced when individuals are ranked 
high.  Thus,  when  ranked  high,  those  with  higher  perceptions  of  procedural 







In  this  study,  we  have  investigated  the  relationships  between  forced  ranking, 
intrinsic  motivation,  justice  perceptions  and  performance.  Several  hypotheses 




Based on  the  tenets  of  feedback  intervention  theory,  it was hypothesized  that 
the lower ranked individuals would demonstrate less performance improvement 
than the higher ranked individuals after receiving feedback. This was grounded in 
the  argument  that  forced  ranking  is  a  summative,  norm‐referenced  form  of 
feedback, which is more likely to direct attention to the self‐level, which in turn 
has been found to be largely ineffective (Kluger & DeNisi 1998). Individuals that 
were  ranked  low  were  expected  to  show  less  performance  improvement 
because  these  participants  received  feedback with  a  negative  sign.  The  results 
however,  tell  a  different  story.  Contrary  to  our  predictions,  individuals  ranking 
high  performed  worse  after  receiving  feedback,  whereas  those  ranking  low 
performed better than those ranking high in scenario two.  
 
Interestingly,  this  finding  can  be  explained  by  combining  the  two  theoretical 
frameworks  of  earlier  feedback  theory,  and  the more  recent  one  of  feedback 
intervention  theory.  Thorndike  and his  law of  effect  suggest  that both positive 
and negative  feedback  should  improve performance because positive  feedback 
reinforces  performance,  whereas  negative  feedback  punishes  the  erroneous 
behavior  (Kluger  &  DeNisi  1998).  By  contrast,  feedback  intervention  theory 
(Kluger & DeNisi 1996) holds  that normative  feedback  that directs attention  to 
the  self  could  attenuate  performance.  Our  findings  indicate  that  receiving 
positive  feedback  trough  being  ranked  high  does  not  bring  forward  any 
facilitating effect on subsequent performance, thus not supporting the principles 
of earlier feedback theory. This finding is more in line with feedback intervention 










not  be  so  destructive  as  suggested  by  some  authors  (e.g.  Hattie  and  Timperly 
2007).  In fact, those who were ranked low improved performance versus those 
who were ranked high in the next scenario, and this clearly does not support our 
hypothesis  that  lower  ranked  individuals would  demonstrate  less  performance 
improvement than the higher ranked individuals. This finding might indicate that 
these  individuals  actually  did  get  a  kick  in  their  pants  to  improve  their 
performance  because  of  the  low  ranking,  supporting  the  tenets  of  earlier 






Based  on  general  feedback  literature,  intrinsic  motivation  was  suggested  to 
mediate  the relationship between  forced ranking and performance. The results 
showed  a  non‐significant  relationship  between  forced  ranking  and  intrinsic 
motivation,  and  a marginally  significant  positive  relationship  between  intrinsic 
motivation  and  performance.  The  finding  that  intrinsic motivation  is  positively 
related to performance is far from novel. Several studies, amongst them Dysvik 
and Kuvaas  (2008), have  identified  intrinsic motivation as a potent predictor of 
task  performance.  Although  the  finding  between  intrinsic  motivation  and 
performance was only marginally significant, this finding still adds to this line of 
research and provides further support for, and credit to, the notion that intrinsic 
motivation  enhances  performance.  Regarding  the  relationship  between  forced 
ranking  and  intrinsic  motivation,  the  simple  regression  found  that  this 








One  reason  for  why  the  relationship  between  forced  ranking  and  intrinsic 
motivation  is not significant might be subscribed to  the manipulation of  forced 
ranking.  The  forced  ranking  was  not  tied  to  any  consequences  and  might 
therefore not have been perceived as very controlling.  It  is perhaps more  likely 
that being  ranked would have been perceived as more  controlling  if  there had 
been any consequences tied to the different rankings, as the normative character 
of forced ranking might have felt more outspoken then. Another reason could be 
the  characteristics  of  forced  ranking.  The  summative  aspect  of  forced  ranking 






In  the  debate  over  forced  ranking,  justice  has  been  identified  as  a  potentially 
important  variable  (Lawler  III  2002;  Meisler  2003),  and  it  was  therefore 
hypothesized  that  both  procedural  and  distributive  justice  would  mediate  the 
relationship between forced ranking and performance.  According to our results, 
this however does not seem to be the case.  Regarding the relationship between 




however,  the  regression  coefficient  is  in  the  hypothesized  direction.  Thus  our 
findings  indicate  that  forced  ranking  do  not  trigger  justice  perceptions  in  this 
study. One explanation for this finding might be subscribed to the time span of 
the  experiment.  According  to  Cohen‐Charash  &  Spector  (2001),  Leventhal  and 







kick  in.  The  same  explanation  might  also  transfer  to  distributive  justice  in 
accordance with  the  vast  amount  of  research  that  has  found  high  correlations 
between procedural and distributive justice (Colquitt, Conlon, Wessen, Porter & 
Ng 2001). Another possible explanation  for our  insignificant  findings might also 
here be related to the lack of consequences tied to the forced ranking. According 
to  Colquitt,  Conlon, Wessen,  Porter  and Ng  (2001),  Adams  suggested  that  one 
way to determine whether an outcome is fair is to calculate one’s own ‘input’ to 
one’s  ‘output’  and  then  compare  that  ratio with  the perceived  ratio of  others. 
The ‘output’ in our experiment is to get a rank that is labeled as high‐, middle‐ or 
low. Receiving one of these rankings does however not imply any consequences. 






would have  a  beneficial  effect  on performance.  Both  justice  variables  failed  to 
reach  statistical  significance.  In  addition,  the  relationship  between  procedural 
justice and performance was opposite of the hypothesized direction, indicating a 
negative relationship between procedural justice and performance. In explaining 
these  findings,  the  results  of  a  meta‐analysis  by  Cohen‐Charash  and  Spector 
(2001)  may  come  in  handy,  as  they  found  a  striking  difference  between 
laboratory  and  field  studies  outcomes  when  dealing  with  work  performance 
related  to  justice.  The  authors  found  that  whereas  the  results  of  field  studies 
showed  a  strong  relationship  between  procedural  justice  and  performance, 
results of  laboratory  studies  showed a weak  relationship between  the  two and 
no  relationship  between  distributive  justice  and  performance.  Cohen‐Charash 
and Spector suggest an explanation for this finding that might relate to our study 




suggest  that  in  a  laboratory  setting,  the  relationship  between  justice  and 




be  marked  by  a  black  sign  and  correct  ones  with  green.  These  instructions 










that  those  with  higher  perceptions  of  procedural  justice  perform  worse  after 
receiving  forced  ranking  feedback  than  those with  low  procedural  justice,  and 
that  this  effect  is  strongest when highly  ranked.  It  is  challenging  to provide  an 
explanation for this finding, as it is difficult to find convincing arguments for why 
participants who perceive that they have been treated fairly and have received a 
high  rank  should  perform  worse  in  the  second  scenario  than  the  rest  of  the 
participants.  Nevertheless,  one  possible  explanation  might  be  that  those  who 














































As with all  research,  this  study has  some  limitations.  First,  the manipulation of 




organizations  collect  the  ratings  for  record  keeping  purposes  only.  The  more 
common use is for organizations to use forced ranking to determine promotions 
or demotions, different assignments and compensation (Schleicher, Bull & Green 
2009).  In  our  experiment  we  did  not  have  the  opportunity  to  tie  any 
consequences  to  the  different  rankings,  which  may  have  caused  a  too  weak 
manipulation.  Furthermore,  forced  ranking  typically  also  follow  a  20‐70‐10 
distribution (Olson & Davis 2003; Hazels & Sasse 2008), whereas we chose a 25‐
50‐25  distribution  for  practical  reasons.  This  might  also  have  affected  the 
strength of the manipulation. As such, it might be that some of the hypothesized 
effect of  forced  ranking disappears when  there  is no  consequences  tied  to  the 
given rank and when utilizing a less strict distribution.    
 
A  second  limitation of  this  study  is  related  to  the strength of  the manipulation 
check.  After  the  participants  received  their  rank  we  asked  them  if  they  were 
aware  of  the  rank  they  had  received.  However,  this manipulation  check  could 
have been stronger in that we for example had asked them to write down their 
rank. This would have given us a greater certainty that they were aware of the 







limitation  is  to  some extent  leveled out by  the  internal validity of  this  study. A 














section, attempts were made  to adjust  for  regression  to  the mean, however, a 





worse  after  feedback,  as  there  is  no  strong  theoretical  basis  for  claiming  that 




















The  implications  for  practice  are  especially  associated  with  the  importance  of 
forced ranking in improving performance. Our results indicate that higher ranked 
individuals perform worse after receiving such feedback. This implies that it may 
not  be  so  unproblematic  to  be  ranked  highly  as  suggested  on  theoretical 
grounds. According to Kluger and DeNisi (1998), this type of feedback should be 
largely  ineffective, however  in our  case  this  type of  feedback  seems  to  lead  to 
deterioration  in  performance.  Coupled  with  the  tendency  (although  non‐




ranking  system was  investigated, and a key  finding was  that  respondents were 
most attracted to systems with less stringent treatment of low performers. This 





Another  practical  implication  is  related  to  our  findings  on  intrinsic motivation. 
Our results found a positive marginally significant relationship between intrinsic 
motivation  and  performance,  however,  not  a  significant  relationship  between 
forced  ranking  and  intrinsic  motivation.  Although  the  relationship  between 
intrinsic  motivation  and  performance  is  only  marginally  significant,  it  still  has 
some  practical  value.  This  finding  implies  that  investment  in  peoples’  intrinsic 
motivation  might  be  beneficial  for  performance.  Thus,  this  finding  might  be 
relevant  for  leaders and people who are working within human  resources who 
want to stimulate a high performing work environment. For a social environment 
to maximize intrinsic motivation it should provide people with the opportunity to 










suggests  that  there  might  be  several  downsides  of  being  ranked  high  and 
perhaps not so bad to be ranked low, which to some degree can be explained by 
more  recent  feedback  theory  (e.g.  Kluger & DeNisi  1996)  and  earlier  feedback 
theory. However,  these  findings unfortunately do not add much clarification  to 
our  understanding  of  forced  ranking,  and  still  there  are  many  unanswered 
questions for future research to address. In particular, it would be interesting to 
see a laboratory experiment utilizing a strict distribution (e.g. 20‐70‐10), and that 




Furthermore,  the  findings  from  this  study  did  not  support  the  inclusion  of 
mediators. However, it would probably be shortsighted to conclude that there is 
no  need  for  future  research  to  include  mediators  in  order  to  understand  the 
effects of forced ranking on performance. The non‐significance of the mediators 
may be due to the manipulation being too weak, and an area of future research 












forced  ranking  emerged.  The  increasing  popularity  of  forced  ranking  calls  for 
knowledge on its effects. Drawing on previous and more recent feedback theory, 
this  study  has  examined  the  influence  of  forced  ranking  on  performance  and 
aimed  to  enhance  our  understanding  of  this  relationship  by  introducing  three 
mediating variables. We found a significant relationship between forced ranking 
and  performance,  however,  the  relationship  was  opposite  of  our  prediction.  
Although this finding was in the opposite direction as hypothesized,  is still adds 
to  feedback  theory and research by  indicating  that performance  feedback such 




distributive  justice  revealed  no  further  clarification  as  almost  all  of  these 
relationships  were  found  to  be  non‐significant.  An  exception  is  the marginally 
significant  finding  of  intrinsic  motivation  on  performance,  which  gives  some 
preliminary  support  to  a  substantial  body  of  research  suggesting  a  facilitating 
effect of intrinsic motivation on performance. Post hoc interaction analyses also 
discovered  a  significant  interaction  effect  of  procedural  justice  on  the 
relationship  between  forced  ranking  and  performance.  This  finding,  together 






and the  facilitating  tendency of  intrinsic motivation on performance  is  to some 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5 point  Likert  ‐ 1=  strongly disagree, 5 =  strongly agree  (adapted  from Colquitt 
2001).  
The following items refer to your feedback score. To what extent:  


























5. Do  you  think  those  procedures  have  been  based  on  accurate 
information?  






















asked  to  indicate  their highest  level of military education, and  to answer  three 
items assessing their experience, training and participation in crisis management. 
The  Kaiser‐Meyer‐  Olkin  value  for  the  factor  analysis  of  these  four  items  was 
.513, which  is below the recommended value of  .6 (Pallant 2010). Nonetheless, 
Bartlett’s  Test  reached  statistical  significance  (p  =  .000).  Due  to  the  statistical 
significance  of  the  Bartlett’s  test  and  that  the  KMO  value  was  not  far  off  the 
recommended value, a factor analysis was performed. The principal component 
analysis  with  oblique  rotation  (Direct  Oblimin)  revealed  the  presence  of  two 
factors  above  Kaiser’s  criterion  of  1,  explaining  75  %  of  the  variance  in 




conform  to  a  simple  structure with  all  factor  loadings  loading  strongly  on only 
one component (Pallant 2010). In particular, the item assessing training in crisis 
management  poses  a  problem  because  it  cross  –  loads  and  in  addition  loads 
below  the  recommended  value  of  .6  for  our  sample  size  (Hair,  Black,  Babin & 






















Item  1  2   
Military education  ‐.057  .931  .854 
Crisis training  .527  .445  .545 
Crisis experience  .904  ‐.338  .841 




There  was  a  weak  correlation  between  the  two  factors  (r  =  .148).  The  results 
suggest the presence of to factors. The first factor reflects crisis experience and 
the second military education. Cronbach’s alpha for the crisis experience factor 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For  our master  thesis  we want  to  investigate  forced  ranking. We  have  looked 
into  theory  and  previous  research  on  forced  ranking,  feedback,  intrinsic 
motivation and fairness and on this note formulated hypotheses.  In the method 












An  important  factor  that  has  been  identified  is  feedback.  Feedback  is  an 
inevitable part of all organizations as it is a form of communication that conveys 
some  degree  of  information  about  past  behavior,  performance  or  achieved 
understanding  (Ilgen,  Fisher  and  Taylor  1979).  Hattie  and  Timperley  (2007) 
recognize  feedback  as  one  of  the  most  powerful  influences  on  achievement 
comparing  it  with  factors  such  as  prior  cognitive  ability,  and  socioeconomic 
influences. Naturally there have also been devoted a lot of research to this field. 
However,  there  is  one  area  within  this  field  that  has  stayed  away  from  the 




Forced  ranking  represents  a  type  of  performance  appraisal  and  refer  to  the 






















The  paper  adheres  to  the  following  outline.  First,  we  will  present  anecdotal 
knowledge and relevant research on forced ranking. Then we will provide theory 








Performance  evaluation  systems  are  one  of  the  most  frequently  used  human 
resource management systems  in organizations today (Blume, Baldwin & Rubin 
2009).  However,  despite  their  pervasive  use,  previous  research  has  identified 
several  problems  in  relation  to  the  application  of  performance  evaluations, 










do  not  differentiate  between  the  employees  (ibid).  Recently,  it  has  therefore 
been a revival of forced ranking systems, which were developed to deal with the 
leniency bias and lack of differentiation. Despite limited evidence linking forced 
ranking  to  actual  improved  organizational  performance,  the  use  of  forced 
ranking  in organizations proliferated greatly  (Blume, Baldwin & Rubin 2009).  In 
fact,  recent  estimates  are  that  approximately  one‐fifth  of  Fortune  1000 
companies use some form of forced ranking systems (Sears & McDermott 2003).  
 
Forced  ranking  is  a  type  of  performance  appraisal  where  evaluations  are 
required  to  fit  along  the  lines  of  a  particular  distribution  (Schleicher,  Bull  and 
Green  2009).  This  performance  evaluation  approach  is  based  on  the  repeated 
finding  in  social  sciences  that  when measured  in  large  enough  samples,  most 
human  phenomena  tend  to  follow  a  normally  distributed  curve  (Guralnik, 
Rozmarin & So 2004).  The “archetype” of forced ranking is thus the procedure of 
categorizing  individuals  into  preexisting  performance  categories,  against  other 
employees in the department or peer group (e.g. a 20‐70‐10 distribution) (Olson 
&  Davis  2003;  Hazels  &  Sasse  2008).  These  performance  rankings  are  then 
applied to a bell curve, with those ranking at the bottom (usually 10%) being put 
on probation, given improvement possibilities or terminated. By contrast, those 
ranking  on  top  (usually  20%)  are  generously  rewarded  for  their  performance 






and  cons  in  both  professional  HR  journals  and  the  media  (e.g.  Meisler  2003).  
Jack Welch,  the  former  superstar  CEO  of  General  Electric,  is  one  of  the  most 
famous proponents of forced ranking (or the “vitality curve” as referred to in the 





authors  have  questioned  the  validity  and  effectiveness  of  the  forced  ranking 
approach (Pfeffer & Sutton 2006). It is perhaps not very difficult to imagine why 
forced  ranking  has  stirred  such  a  debate.  While  traditional  performance 
appraisals usually are criterion‐based  (establishing a performance  level),  forced 
ranking  is about distinguishing people  (Hazels & Sasse 2008). Thus, ratings may 
be perceived to be unfair because managers are forced to place their employees 













note  that  feedback  is  far  from  a  simple  stimulus  as  feedback  has  several 
dimensions.  One  of  the most  important  distinctions  is  feedback  sign‐ whether 
the feedback  is positive or negative (Ilgen, Fisher & Taylor 1979, Podsakoff and 
Farh  1989).  Furthermore,  feedback  can  be  conceptualized  as  formative  or 
summative  and  norm‐referenced  or  self‐referenced  (Chan  &  Lam  2010). 
Summative  feedback  focuses  on  the  outcome,  whereas  formative  feedback 
provides the individual with learning cues in how to progress (Taras 2005; Covic 
&  Jones  2008).  Self‐referenced  feedback  involves  self‐comparative  appraisal, 
whereas  norm‐referenced  concerns  social‐comparative  appraisal  (Chan  &  Lam 
2010). Applied to the case of forced ranking it is seems reasonable to argue that 
forced ranking is a summative, norm‐referenced form of feedback. The feedback 




appropriate  to  be  placed  in  relative  to  others  in  the  peer  group.  Thus,  forced 





also  transmits  to  our  knowledge  on  the  relation  between  forced  ranking  and 
performance.  Nonetheless,  there  are  some  studies  that  have  approached  the 




however,  potential  side  effects  such  as  decline  in  employee  moral,  general 
dissatisfaction,  lowered  organizational  commitment  and  possible  increase  in 
turnover were identified. Research conducted by Garcia and Tor (2007) provides 
further knowledge on why these negative effects might occur. By nature, forced 
ranking  involves  social  comparison.  Leaning  on  research  and  findings  from 
Festinger, Garcia and Tor (2007) claim that this comparison process often results 
in  competitive  behavior.  Their  findings  indicate  that  it  is  competition  on  a 
general  scale  rather  than  task  comparison  that  is  the  main  social  comparison 
facilitator of competitive behavior, and therefore suggest that forced ranking can 




self  selection,  the  championing  of  forced  rankings  fails  to  anticipate  how  competitive 
forces may ultimately  inhibit  the profit‐maximizing exchange or pooling of  information 
and resources among those ‘star’ employees.  
On the basis of the study by Scullen et al. (2005) it is possible to argue that there 
is  a  relationship  between  forced  ranking  and  organizational  performance. 








It  is  a well‐established  finding  that  feedback  is  related  to  performance  (Kim & 
Hamner 1976; Illgen, Fisher & Taylor 1979; Larson Jr. 1989; Early, Northcraft, Lee 
& Lituchy 1990; Kluger & DeNisi 1998; Goodman, Wood & Hendrickx 2004; Hattie 
&  Timperley  2007;  Anseel,  Lievens  &  Schollaert  2009).  As  pointed  to  above, 
forced  ranking  is  a  form  of  performance  feedback,  hence  forced  ranking  are 
expected to relate to performance in some way or another. The initial theoretical 
arguments for the effectiveness of feedback were provided by Thorndike and his 
law  of  effect  (Kluger  &  DeNisi  1998).  Positive  feedback  was  equated  with 
reinforcement, and negative feedback with punishment. Both types of feedback 
should improve performance because positive feedback reinforces performance, 
whereas  negative  feedback  punishes  the  erroneous  behavior  (Kluger  &  DeNisi 
1998).  An  influential  and  much  cited  review  by  Ammons  (1956)  gave  further 
support  for  the  beneficial  effect  of  feedback  on  performance.  Given  this 
understanding of  feedback we would expect  that  feedback provided  through a 
forced ranking system would be beneficial to performance because the top 20% 
should  be  even more motivated  to  perform, whereas  those  in  the middle  and 
low categories would get a kick in the pants to enhance their performance.  
 
Nevertheless, more  recent  research  on  feedback  (e.g.  Kluger  and DeNisi  1996) 
suggests  that  not  all  feedback  necessarily  lead  to  better  performance.  Indeed, 
the  presence  of  negative  effects  of  feedback  is  robust;  about  34‐38  %  of  the 
effect sizes investigated in a meta‐analysis by Kluger and DeNisi (1996) showed a 
negative  effect  on  subsequent  performance.  The  theoretical  explanation 
provided  (Feedback  Intervention  Theory)  suggests  that  feedback  that  directs 
attention  to  the  self  (for  example  “You  are  a  great  student”)  is more  likely  to 
attenuate the effect of  feedback on performance. By contrast, feedback effects 




example  “This  essay  can  be  improved  if  elaborating  more  on  the  theoretical 
concepts”). The explaining mechanism is that cues that shifts attention to the self 
reallocates cognitive resources from task to the self, and in such a way weaken 
performance  (Kluger  &  DeNisi  1996).  The major  discriminator  is  thus  whether 











forced  ranking.  Given  that  feedback  derived  from  forced  ranking  is  normative, 
that  is, feedback that conveys comparative information,  it could be argued that 
this type of  feedback diverts attention from the  task  to  the self. Feedback  that 
directs  attention  to  the  self  via  normative  cues  has  been  shown  to  be  largely 
ineffective  (Kluger  and  DeNisi  1998).  Similarly,  a  study  by  Butler  (1987)  found 
that grades  increased ego  involvement, but did not affect performance relative 
to  the  no‐feedback  control  group.  This  contradicts  the  understanding  of 
feedback  given  by  Thorndike  and  Ammons  (Kluger  &  DeNisi  1998),  in  that 
feedback  is  not  universally  positively  linked  to  performance.  Nonetheless,  it 
could  also  very  well  be  argued  that  forced  ranking  feedback  also  conveys 
information regarding task performance, although on a relative scale. In contrast 
to feedback directed to self, task‐ focused feedback have shown to increase task 
involvement  and  consequently  performance  (Butler  1987).  In  particular, 
feedback that provides corrective information (e.g. formative feedback) has been 







However,  given  that  forced  ranking  conveys  comparative  information,  it would 
be  hard  to  overlook  the  social  comparison  aspect  of  forced  ranking,  which  is 




the  forced  ranking  feedback  does  not  indicate  any  learning  cues  (corrective 
information is limited) it seems likely that the feedback obtained will not have a 





H1b.  Subjects  ranked middle maintain  or  decrease  performance  after  receiving 
forced ranking feedback. 




Owning  to  the  limited  research  on  forced  ranking,  we  know  little  about  what 
factors that might intervene between forced ranking and performance. However, 
as  forced  ranking  represents  a  type  of  feedback,  we  expect  that  the  effect  of 
forced  ranking  on  performance  should  be  mediated  by  motivation.  This  as 
feedback  is  widely  believed  to  affect  motivation  (Bandura  1993;  Deci  &  Ryan 









as  a  sub‐theory  within  SDT  with  the  aim  of  specifying  factors  that  explain 
variability in intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan 2000). Intrinsic motivation can be 
defined as the motivation to perform an activity for itself, in order to experience 
the  pleasure  and  satisfaction  inherent  in  the  activity  (Deci  and  Ryan  1985). 
According to the STD and CET feedback that are interpreted as information about 
one’s  competence  and  satisfy  individuals’  need  for  autonomy  will  enhance 
intrinsic motivation (Deci, Ryan & Koestner 1999; Gagne & Deci 2005). Moreover, 
research  has  shown  that  positive  performance  feedback  can  enhance  intrinsic 
motivation, and that negative performance feedback can diminish it (Deci, Ryan 
&  Koestner  1999;  Deci  &  Ryan  2000;).  However,  positive  feedback  that  is 
perceived  as  controlling,  that  is,  positive  feedback  having  an  evaluative 
character,  or  emphasizing  how  one  should  perform  –  has  clearly  shown  to 
decrease  intrinsic  motivation  (Ryan  1982;  Deci,  Connell  &  Ryan  1989).  Ryan 
(1982)  suggests  that  positive  feedback  can  be  perceived  either  as  informal  or 
controlling depending on various factors, and that these will determine whether 
the  positive  feedback  increases  or  decreases  intrinsic motivation.  Drawing  this 
link to forced ranking one could believe that positive rank could be interpreted as 
controlling  as  forced  ranking  have  a  normative  character  and  thus  state 
something about how a person should perform leading to a decrease in intrinsic 
motivation.  However,  a  positive  rank  could  also  be  interpreted  as  information 
about  one’s  competence  and  therefore  increase  intrinsic  motivation.  For 
participants’  receiving  a  negative  rating  it  is  possible  to  infer  that  they  will 
experience  a  decline  in  intrinsic motivation  in  both  of  the  conditions  –  either 
they  perceive  the  ranking  as  controlling  or  as  decreasing  perceptions  of 
competence: both of which decreasing intrinsic motivation. Accordingly, there is 




Before  the  millennium  few  studies  had  examined  the  performance  effects 
associated  with  intrinsic  motivation.  Rather,  much  of  the  intrinsic  motivation 






the  unique  effects  of  multiple  sources  on  task  performance,  and  found  that 
intrinsic  motivation  had  the  greatest  effect  on  performance.  Moreover,  two 
studies  by  Kuvaas  (2006;  2007)  reported  a  positive  relation  between  intrinsic 
motivation and performance.  In a study on transformational  leadership and job 
behaviors  Piccolo  and  Colquitt  (2006)  also  found  that  the  indirect  effect  of 
intrinsic motivation supported the direct effect of transformational leadership on 
task performance. Finally, a study by Dysvik and Kuvaas (2008) observed that the 
relationship  between  perceived  training  opportunities  and  work  performance 
was  fully mediated  by  intrinsic motivation.  All  these  studies  thus  suggest  that 







Fairness  has  been  identified  as  a  potentially  important  variable  in  the  debate 
over forced ranking (Lawler III 2002; Meisler 2003; Olson & Davis 2003; Sears & 
McDermott 2003), and a peak into the organizational justice research therefore 
seems  appropriate.  Research  on  organizational  justice  has  identified  different 
forms of justice, most notably distributive justice and procedural justice (Colquitt 
2001). Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of outcomes, whereas 
procedural  justice  refers  to  the  perceived  fairness  of  the  process  by  which 
outcomes  where  arrived  at  (Cohen‐Charash  &  Spector  2001).  A  number  of 
studies  have  linked  fairness  perceptions  to  important  organizational  outcomes 
such  as  affective  commitment  (Kuvaas  2003),  organizational  commitment 
(Farndale,  Hope‐Hailey  &  Kelliher  2011),  performance  (Lind,  Kanfer  &  Earley 




interest  of  organizations  to  maximize  employees’  fairness  perceptions  (Roch, 
Sternburgh & Caputo 2007).  
 
Although  considerable  research  has  documented  the  importance  of  fairness 
perceptions in connection to performance evaluation processes in organizations 
(Bartol,  Durham & Poon  2001),  there  is  however  no  studies  to  our  knowledge 
that  investigates fairness reactions and subsequent performance after receiving 
forced ranking feedback. Nonetheless, research on performance evaluations has 
identified  the  format  of  performance  appraisal  systems  to  be  important  in 
connection to fairness. A study by Roch, Sternburgh and Caputo (2007) suggest 
that relative formats are perceived to be less fair than absolute formats, with the 
forced  ranking  format  perceived  to  be  the  least  fair.  Furthermore,  Bartol, 





a  colleague  performing  one  standard  deviation  above  average,  which  could 
influence fairness perceptions.  
 
It  is  reasonable  to  argue  that  both  procedural  and  distributive  justice  are 
important  in connection to forced ranking. First, equity theory holds that when 
an individual perceives distributive injustice at work, the employee can alter his 
or  her  quality  and  quantity  of  work  to  re‐establish  justice  (Cohen‐Charash  & 
Spector  2001).  Furthermore,  research  suggests  that  people  tend  to  be  highly 
influenced  by  social  comparison  information,  and  that  information  about  an 
individual’s  standing  within  a  group  influences  distributive  justice  perceptions 
(Bartol, Durham & Pool 2001).  Forced  ranking does  indeed  convey  information 
regarding relative standing within a group; hence it is argued that forced ranking 
affects  the perceptions of distributive  justice.  For example,  given  the  tendency 





low.  Second,  research  has  shown  that  when  outcomes  are  low,  fairness 
perceptions of procedural justice becomes more important (Roch, Sternburgh & 
Caputo  2007).  Thus,  individuals who  receive  relatively  high  ratings may  not be 
particularly  concerned  about  procedural  justice,  and  would  be  more  likely  to 
perceive the ratings as fair. Nonetheless, people are less likely to pay attention to 




ranked  a  C  player  (10th  percentile)  it  is  obvious  that  quite  a  few  people  have 
performed better than you. Therefore, because of the availability of comparative 
information  it  is  argued  that  the  perceptions  of  distributive  and  procedural 
justice will parallel each other. We therefore hypothesize the following: 
 
H3.    Fairness  perceptions  will  mediate  the  relationship  between  feedback  and 
performance 
H3a.  Subjects  ranked  in  the  high  category will  perceive  the  highest  distributive 
and procedural justice. 
H3b.  Subjects  ranked  in  the middle  category  will  perceive  less  distributive  and 
procedural justice than subjects ranked high. 






simulation.  Using  this  simulation  provides  many  advantages.  Maybe  the  most 
prominent that  it gives a complex model of reality (Salas, Wildman, and Piccolo 
2009). This simulation will involve a scenario database, where participants are to 









In order  to attain a  representative  selection we will need 120 participants. We 




















Can  be  measured  on  the  basis  of  detection,  information  search  and  attack, 
where each type has a minimum and maximum score. The range of the different 
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